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Introduction
The European Community's stance  in the Uruguay Round Agricultural
negotiations needs to be seen against the background of an ongoing
process of economic integration which is still  far from complete.  It
also needs to be seen in a historical perspective, particularly that of
the Common Agricultural  Policy (CAP).
The Community is characterized by the persistence of substantial
regional disparities  in per capita income, unemployment, the relative
importance of agriculture in the economy and other economic indicators
(Table 1).  These disparities suggest that the EC  (12)  still has a long
way to go before attaining the degree of economic  and social
integration already achieved in North America.  Community decision
makers appear to take the view that such disparities justify continuing
to afford EC agriculture some measure of protection from the vagaries
of unstable world prices and exchange rates.  This interpretation of
the basic reason for the continued protectiveness of the CAP does not,
of course, deny that substantial differences of view exist amongst
economists on the relative merits of "openness" and "protection"  in the
pursuit of long-term economic growth.  A further reason for the
adoption of a protective stance is  the pervasiveness of political
constraints upon trade liberalization.
The nature and origins of the CAP
Turning from the present to  the past, the  formulation of the CAP
was the major "achievement" of the six foundation members of the EC  in
1Table  1
BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS WITHIN THE EC (EUR 12) AND IN
NORTH AMERICA
Percent
GDP/cap  Total  employed in
(a) current  population  Unemployment  agriculture  Av. holding
market prices  (1986)  rate  (1987)  forestry and  size  (1985)
Country  (1988) PPS 1 millions  percent  fishing  (1987)  ha
Bel.  13,883  9.9  12.1  2.8  14.1
Den.  16,025  5.1  7.5  6.5  30.7
W.G.  15,702  61.1  8.1  5.2  16.0
Greece  7,670  10.0  2.8  27.0  4.3
Spain  9,893  38.7  20.4  15.1  12.9
France  15,042  55.4  11.1  7.1  27.0
Ir.  8,537  3.5  19.1  15.4  22.7
Italy  14,527  57.2  14.1  10.5  5.6
Lux.  17,326  0.37  1.7  3.7  28.6
Ned.  14,527  14.6  11.8  4.7  14.9
Port.  7,196  10.2  7.0  22.2  4.3
U.K.  14,158  56.8  10.7  2.4  65.1
EUR (12)  13,639  322.8  11.6  8.0  12.9
CANADA  17,428  25.4  6.9  5.1  n.a.
(1985)  (1986)  (1986)
U.S.A.  21,307  239.3  9.5  3.1  180.2
(1985)  (1986)  (1986)
Sources:  Eurostat, Basic Statistics of the Community, European Commission, The
Agricultural  Situation in the Community, World Bank, World Development Report.
1PPS-purchasing power  standard ($U.S.)its early days.  The CAP is based upon the  three mutually supporting
principles of common prices, common financing and Community preference.
The  task of harmonizing six very diverse  systems of national
agricultural support and protection to  accord with the  application of
these principles was inherently difficult.  Several years of hard work
were needed to achieve success  interspersed by numerous  internal
disputes and disagreements,  including the celebrated episode  in 1965
when France withdrew from the Community for six months, ostensibly on
the question of agricultural financing, but really on the  issue of the
ability of individual member states  to veto council decisions.  Having
resolved this  dispute (with the  "Luxembourg Compromise") and many
others,  the architects of the CAP were justly proud of their
achievement  in completing the edifice.
The protectiveness of the CAP  is enshrined in the principle of
Community preference, whereby third country suppliers are deliberately
placed at a competitive disadvantage compared with community suppliers
on community markets.  The emphasis  given to this principle by the
architects of the CAP is explained by the long tradition of
agricultural protectionism in EC  (6)  member states, especially France
and Germany, both before and after the Second World War.  It is
essential to view the nature  of the CAP in this context.  Thus, if the
UK and Denmark had been founder members of the EC,  the CAP might well
have been less protective.  But, in the event, those countries did not
join the Community until after the nature and form of the CAP had
already been decided by the  EC  (6) member states.  A major reason why
the UK and Denmark delayed their applications for membership was basic
2disagreements with the  EC  (6) on agricultural policy.  But once they
decided to seek accession to  the  Community, acceptance of the CAP, as
it stood, became a condition of admission.
Problems of the CAP and internal pressures  for reform
The common prices of regulated commodities  (i.e.,  commodities
covered by CAP regulations)  tended to be set at a high level.  This was
a virtually inevitable result of harmonizing a wide range of national
price levels which  initially prevailed in member states.  With the
benefit of hindsight,  it  is easy  to see that setting CAP prices high
relative both to world prices and to  the costs of low-cost EC
producers was bound to  lead to serious problems of over-production and
structural surplus accumulation.  But there  is  little or no evidence
that when the CAP was formed during the early and mid-1960s,  its
architects anticipated such problems.  The Community was  then
considerably less than self-sufficient in nearly all agricultural
commodities.  However, the  EC Commission did come to recognize over-
production as a major problem of the CAP, even before the first
enlargement from EC  (6) to EC  (9) in 1973.  Thus  the Mansholt Plan
(1968) advocated major farm structural reform to create larger and more
efficient farms to enable prices to be lowered nearer to market
clearing levels.
The Mansholt Plan encountered fierce political opposition,
especially from farm representative organizations who dubbed Mansholt
the  "peasant killer."  Although, in 1971, the Council agreed to a much
watered down scheme of farm structural reform, the pressure to apply
the brakes to rising agricultural production especially through price
3policy, was temporarily relieved by the world-wide agricultural crisis
of 1972-73 when the prices of grains and other commodities  rose to
unprecedented levels.  However, the Commission returned to the  task of
formulating proposals for the reform of the CAP, and especially to
contain expenditures in the guarantee  section of FEOGA (the
Agricultural Budget) as  early as 1973, with the publication of
"Memorandum Agriculture,  1973-1978."  But, apart from a few cosmetic
measures,  such as the co-responsibility levy  imposed on milk producers
in 1977,  the Council failed to  take the need for reform seriously until
the  1980 "Mandate," under which the Commission was required to come
forward with proposals for curbing the budget.  But the pressure for
fundamental CAP reform was again abated by a temporary improvement in
world agricultural prices in the early 1980s.  Action on the Mandate
was also held up by the delay in finding a solution to  the
contemporaneous problem of the British budget contribution.  However, a
package deal was  finally agreed by the European Council in March 1984.
The package included a solution to  the British problem combined with
the introduction of milk quotas  to curb agricultural expenditure.  This
is  now recognized as the first significant and substantial measure of
CAP reform.
A  substantial volume of independent academic critiques of the CAP,
including radical proposals  for reform, appeared almost from the time
of its formation.  So  for example, as early as 1971, two British
critics proposed that the EC should abandon agricultural price support
--  apart from a low "safety net"  --  in favor of direct budgetary
compensation for existing farmers  (Marsh and Ritson,  1971).
4External pressures for reform
During the early 1950s  the movement towards European integration,
and the formation of the EC,  were encouraged by the United States and
other Western countries, mainly for strategic reasons.  The possibility
of an economic backlash,  including international  trading problems, may
have been foreseen, but was not viewed then as  being paramount.
The Dillon Round of multilateral trade negotiations in GATT,
during 1960-61, coincided with an early stage of CAP formation, though
not before the Variable Import Levy (VIL)  had been adopted as  the major
protective instrument.  The United States then tried but failed to
obtain from the European Community guaranteed access  for its existing
level  of agricultural exports.  With the benefit of hindsight,  it is
now clear that, from the point of view of the  EC's competitors, the
major achievement of the Dillon Round was the binding of duty rates on
oilseeds, oilseed products and cereal substitutes at low or zero
levels.  At the  time the EC was  far from self-sufficient  in these
commodities and probably failed to realize the  importance of this
concession.
The Kennedy Round of MTNs  (1964-67) coincided with a  later but
still unfinished stage of establishing the CAP.  So the Kennedy Round
was the final opportunity for the GATT to  influence the CAP before its
completion.  During the Kennedy Round the  EC proposed that all measures
of agricultural support might be reduced to a common denominator termed
the margin of support or  "montant de soutien."  Moreover, having agreed
upon the common denominator, it might also be feasible to  agree to bind
the margin of support.  With the benefit of hindsight, this appears to
5have been a somewhat  remarkable offer by the EC anticipating by some 20
to  25 years the current PSE approach to  agricultural policy and trade
reform.  However, at the time, this and other EC proposals were
rejected by the United States and other temperate agricultural product
exporters, ostensibly because the EC  failed to offer any reduction in
margins of support, but possibly also for other reasons  such as
unwillingness to accept domestic policy constraints.
By the  time of the Tokyo Round of MTNs  (1973-79) the edifice of
the  CAP was complete and the  EC's negotiating mandate was quite
explicit in insisting that since  the principles and mechanisms of the
CAP could not be called into question, they were strictly non-
negotiable.  The montant de soutien proposal was not repeated.  The
Tokyo Round ended in 1979 without making any significant impact on the
CAP or achieving other major advances  in lowering agricultural
protection.
Reforms actually achieved
The milk quota scheme, adopted in 1984, has been effective  in
"capping" EC milk production.  The total quota has  in fact been reduced
since  the start of the scheme, by 6 percent in 1987-88 and 2.5 percent
after 1988-89.  The Brussels Summit of February  1988, extended the life
of the scheme until 1992, but most informed observers expect it to
continue indefinitely.  Existing milk producers who hold quotas are
generally in favor of the scheme.  Intervention stocks of butter,
skimmed milk, and other dairy projects have virtually disappeared.
But, the prices received by producers and paid by consumers remain high
compared with world market levels.
6In the case of milk, the Council chose quotas, a non-market
instrument, in preference to a price cut large enough to counter or
reduce production by the required amount.  But in February 1988,  the
Brussels Summit adopted "stabilizers" to  limit budgetary expenditure on
most other CAP regulated commodities.  Commodity stabilizers consist of
two related elements:
1)  an aggregate production threshold (or MGQ),  and
2)  a punitive "co-responsibility" levy to penalize producers for
exceeding the threshold.
In the case of cereals, two levies apply.  A basic levy, amounting
to 3 percent of the intervention price is  augmented by a supplementary
levy of the same magnitude  (i.e.,  3 percent).  Both levies are
collected from individual producers at  the first point of sale, but the
supplementary levy is  refundable if the MGQ  is not exceeded.  If the
MGQ  is exceeded, there  is  also a deferred price penalty in that the
following year's intervention price is  automatically reduced by the
amount of the supplementary levy.
Commodity stabilizers are complemented by overall budgetary
discipline.  The rate of growth of FEOGA guarantee expenditure cannot
exceed 74 percent of the Community's annual GDP growth rate.  This
"agricultural guideline" effectively imposes an absolute ceiling on
each year's FEOGA guarantee expenditure.
The Commission has set up  an "early warning system" to monitor
FEOGA expenditure and compliance with the agricultural guideline.
Should an overshoot threaten, the Commission is obliged to table
proposals for strengthening stabilizers, and the Council must act
7within two months.
2.  The EC's attitude  to the Uruguay Round and negotiating  stance on
agriculture
The Uruguay Round was launched in 1986 with the Punte del  Este
Declaration which committed GATT member countries  to a new round of
MTN's emphasizing the reform of agricultural trade.  The European
Community's attitude to the launching of the Uruguay Round was
ambivalent.  On the  one hand, like other countries with highly
protected domestic agricultures and growing burdens of agricultural
support expenditure, the  EC could perceive the potential benefits of
relieving budgetary pressure through international agreement to limit
and reduce agricultural support and protection.  The EC also had
motives for safeguarding wider, non-agricultural  trading interests,
especially with the United States, which refusal to negotiate on
agriculture might have compromised.  On the other hand, the EC's
attitude to a new round of MTNs, with agriculture at the center of the
stage, was tempered by a continued unwillingness  to allow the CAP to be
the  subject of international negotiations.  The internal political
costs of giving ground on this  issue were still considered to be too
high.
Unlike the EC,  the United States and the Cairns Group countries
were wholeheartedly in favor of agricultural trade liberalization.  So
the EC's major agricultural market competitors were probably more
influential than the EC itself in launching the Uruguay Round.
However, the absence  from the Punte del Este Declaration of any
explicit mention of export subsidies may reflect the EC's influence.
8The EC's  1987 position paper on agriculture
The EC's  initial position paper on agriculture was tabled in
Geneva after the US had presented its  "zero-option" proposal.  Thus the
stance adopted by the EC was,  in part, a reaction to the US proposal.
The  EC condemned the US proposal as  "unrealistic,"  but also
accepted the desirability of reaching international agreement on
measures of agricultural trade reform, both short-term and long-term.
Short-term measures of two  types were proposed:
(1)  Action to  reduce instability in particular commodity markets  like
cereals  (and cereal  substitutes),  sugar and dairy products  through
market management, and
(2)  Action to  reduce excess commodity supplies overhanging
international markets through negotiations to lower levels of producer
support  and protection.
For  the long-term, the  EC proposed a concerted move towards
reduced domestic support over a wide range of commodities, allied with
lower external protection, but not their phasing out.
The  EC attitude to PSEs
The EC also advanced a proposal similar to  the  "montant de
soutien" proposal  it had put forward during the Kennedy Round.  In its
1987 position paper, the EC  again offered to contemplate binding and
reducing levels of protection in GATT, using the PSE 1 or  similar
device, but with two provisos:
1)  Any agreement on binding overall  levels of protection must be
1Like  alternative AMSs,  the producer's subsidy equivalent  (PSE) is  a summary measure of the impact of all forms of government support
and protection on farm incomes.
9sufficiently flexible to permit protection of particular commodities  to
be increased -- termed the "re-balancing" proposal.
2)  The fundamental principles of the CAP, including the principle of
community preference maintained by means of the variable  import levy
(VIL)  and variable export subsidy (VES), must continue  to remain off
the negotiating table.
In October  1988, the EC tabled a further paper proposing
progressive reductions  in support over five years from a 1984 baseline
(1984 was a year of peak production in the EC, immediately preceding
the introduction of milk quotas).  However, the proposed reductions in
agricultural support were not quantified.  The same paper also included
details of the EC's proposal for a modified AMS, termed the  "support
measurement unit"  (SMU).  The  SMU differs importantly from the PSE in
two respects:
1)  It gives credit for government imposed supply control.
2)  It measures the difference between the domestic support price  (Ps)
and a fixed external  reference price  expressed in national currency,
instead of an unstable world price  (Pw).
A diagram will serve to clarify the first mentioned of these
differences.
In Figure 1, price support without supply control produces
equilibrium at output level Qs.  At this output,  the unit PSE is  Ps-Pw,
where Pw is  the external  reference price.  Ps-Pw also represents  the
marginal economic rent which producers derive from price support at
output level Qs.  Now suppose that a government imposed quota limits
aggregate supply to output level Q.  An effect of supply control is  to
10Figure 1
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Comparison of PSE with SMU:  the  EC proposal for
allowing a PSE  'credit'  for supply controlreduce the marginal economic rent from Ps-Pw to a lower  level
represented by the vertical distance between the supply curve and Pw  at
output level Q.  This distance  also represents the unit SMU with output
constrained at Q.  Just as the aggregate PSE at Qs  is  (PSEu)(Qs) where
PSEu is  the unit PSE,  so  the  aggregate SMU at Q is  (SMUu)(Q) where SMUu
is  the unit SMU.
The SMU also makes a clear distinction between trade-distorting
and non-trade-distorting levels  of domestic output.  Output level Qe,
which equilibriates the supply price with Pw, is  considered to be non-
trade-distorting.  Qe also defines the output level where SMU-O.
The  SMU is  similar  in conception to the Canadian "trade distortion
equivalent"  (TDE) 1 .
3.  EC's position at Montreal mid-term review.  December 1988
At the mid-term review of the Uruguay Round held in Montreal  in
December 1988, the United States  refused to budge from  its  insistence
that any negotiations on lowering agricultural  support levels in the
short-term must be preceded by a prior commitment to the elimination of
support within 10 years.
The European Community not only refused to  subscribe to the zero-
option but also  either to  quantify the reductions  in farm support it
was prepared to make,  or  the  time period over which it was prepared to
make them.
1The author's  analysis of the  difference between the PSE and the SMU derives from the work of Don McClatchy at Agriculture Canada and in particular from the Government of Canada (1988).
11In his report to the Montreal meeting, the Chairman of the
Negotiating Group on Agriculture (NGA) worked hard, but  in vain, to
find enough common ground between the U.S. and the  EC for some
agreement to be reached.  Ministers were invited to decide  "whether the
ultimate goal should be  the elimination or the substantial reduction of
trade distortive support and protection"  (author's emphases).
The Uruguay Round might have collapsed as  a consequence of the
impasse reached at Montreal.  But the negotiations were saved by an
agreement to adjourn until a re-convened meeting of agricultural
officials  to be held in Geneva in April 1989.  In the meantime, the
Secretary-General  of the GATT was  instructed to seek a means to escape
from the impasse.
Concessions made and gained at Geneva. April 1989
The cooling off period between Montreal and the date of the re-
convened meeting in Geneva appears to have produced a change of heart
on both sides, especially in the U.S. where the change of President
apparently gave negotiators a better sense of what might be politically
feasible, not only abroad but also at home,  in dealing with Congress
and various farm lobbies.
The change of heart enabled the GATT Secretary-General  to succeed
where the Chairman of the NGA had failed.  The Dunkel Text, forming the
basis of the agreement reached at Geneva, termed the  "Geneva Accord,"
turned out to be remarkably similar in most respects to  the  Chairman's
Report at Montreal.  However, the Dunkel Text contained no reference to
the possible elimination of trade distorting support and protection,
but only to the possibility of substantial Drogressive reductions in
12them, giving credit for measures  taken since the Punte del  Este
Declaration  (i.e.,  since  1986).  This compromise  reflected concessions
made both by the U.S. on the  zero-option, and by the EC, which wanted
credit for measures taken since  1984.
The Geneva Accord was,  in its  turn, notable for  its similarity to
the Dunkel Text.  However, a notable  feature of the Accord was the
omission of any reference to supply control.  This could be interpreted
as a victory for the United States, since Dunkel had proposed there
should be no short-term relaxation of supply control measures.  There
were also some differences in wording between the Dunkel Text and the
Accord on both long-term and short-term measures to promote export
competition.  However, these differences do not appear  to be of
decisive  importance.
4.  Current state of play:  where do we go  from here?
This section opens with a brief assessment of the  "achievements"
marked by the Geneva Accord.  This  is  followed by a review of the
European Community's possible response to the call for short-term cuts
in agricultural support and protection.  This  leads on to a
consideration of the Community's likely stance in negotiations  on long-
term measures of agricultural policy and trade reform, including both
the role of PSEs  and the alternative option of extending or tightening
GATT rules and disciplines.
Geneva Accord "achievements"
Study of the Geneva Accord points  to  three principal achievements.
13First, agreement was reached that there  should be an immediate short-
term freeze and standstill on the application of measures of
agricultural support and protection, subject  to existing law.  Second,
it was agreed in principle that initial cuts  in support and protection
should be made, starting in 1990, as a "down payment" towards  larger
long-term reductions.  But the down payments were not quantified at
Geneva, although contracting parties were required to table  'statements
of intent' by October 1989.  Third, the Geneva Accord entailed for  the
contracting parties a commitment in principle to substantial
progressive long-term reductions  in support and protection over an
agreed but as yet unspecified period of time.
Which of those three Geneva Accord achievements was  the most
crucial?  Opinions differ, but,the writer is  inclined to  think that the
very short-term freeze and standstill agreement was critically
important as a pre-condition for embarking on negotiations for the
long-term.
The  EC response to the call  for short-term cuts  and likely stance  in
negotiations on long-term reform measures.
Dealing first with the question of short-term cuts  in support and
protection, the United States is  still implementing planned cuts in the
budget prices of grains  in 1989 and 1990.  Likewise,  the EC hopes that
support price cuts resulting from existing and on-going reforms,
including the  'stabilizers'  agreed early in 1988, will obviate the need
for additional CAP reform measures to be devised and implemented at
least until 1991.
Turning from short-term "down payments" to the likely EC stance in
14negotiations on long-term measures of reform, the declared objectives
of these negotiations are:
1)  Substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and
protection over an agreed period"  (as stipulated by the Geneva Accord),
and
2)  "Strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines"  for agricultural trade  (as stipulated by the Uruguay Round
Declaration of 1986).
Two general points can be made on the  EC's  likely response to
these objectives, before moving on to more technical considerations.
One of these points seems to be favorable to successful MTNs on
agriculture, but the other less  so.
The favorable argument is that CAP decision makers are now firmly
committed to reducing price  incentives, even more than has already
occurred, in order to reconcile farm budget spending with fiscal
realities.  The long-term momentum towards lower support is  reinforced
by a growing awareness that, due  to the impact of continual
productivity growth caused by technical progress, budget expenditure
cannot be capped merely by freezing prices.
The  less favorable argument is that current CAP reforms have been
prompted primarily, not by international obligations but by domestic
considerations such as:
1)  the fiscal necessity of controlling the Community budget,
2)  the political necessity of attempting to resolve conflict amongst
member states with respect to sharing the costs and benefits of budget
expenditure,
153)  the political  imperative of resolving problems of Community
enlargement, and
4)  the newest priority of ensuring that intra-Community agricultural
trade  is  fully consistent with the requirements of the single European
market as required by the Single European Act of 1985.
External political pressure for CAP reform, such as those exerted via
the GATT, do not appear  to have had much influence in the past.  The
main impetus has come  from within the Community.  But economic
pressures, such as  competitive export subsidies, may have had some
effect.
Having dealt with these two general points with a bearing on the
EC  stance in multilateral trade negotiations directed at long-term
agricultural reforms, we now turn to more technical  issues.  Two major
issues appear to be:
1)  the role of PSEs  (or other AMS),  compared with commitments on
specific policy measures, in lowering agricultural support and
protection, and
2)  the  implications of the Geneva Accord commitment to extending the
ambit of and otherwise tightening GATT rules and disciplines.
These issues are briefly discussed below.
The role  of PSEs
The EC appears  to be favorably disposed to  the use of PSEs, both
to monitor and to bind support levels, subject to other parties to the
negotiations adopting an acceptable definition of the PSE  (or other
AMS).  As explained above, the critical  issues for the EC  in this
context are:  1)  adjustment for short-term price and exchange rate
16fluctuations, and 2)  obtaining credit for domestic supply control.
Specific reasons for expecting the  EC to  favor the PSE approach to
policy and trade reform include:
1)  Current  (i.e.,  Uruguay Round) and post  (i.e.,  Kennedy Round) offers
to negotiate on the basis of using a comprehensive indicator both to
measure and bind support  levels.
2)  The PSE approach might permit more flexibility in complying with
the requirements of any agreement than commitments  on specific
policies, especially with respect  to the protection of particular
commodities.  The Community is  known to be keen to  gain acceptance of
the principle of "re-balancing" commodity support  levels.  It may
therefore be more likely to accept a progressive reduction in support
and protection, measured in terms  of an overall AMS,  than a program
requiring individual commodity AMSs  to be lowered at a uniform rate.
3)  The EC proposal  that PSEs  should allow credit for domestic supply
control implies that, if forced to yield ground on the issue of
'overall' versus  'individual commodity' PSEs, the Community is  likely
to  favor an  ggregate rather than a per unit commodity PSE measure.
Consider the example of the milk quota scheme.  Because the support
price  remains high relative  to the world price, the PSE per unit of
production is correspondingly high.  But, ceteris paribus,  the effect
of the quota is  to lower  the aggregate PSE attributable to the milk
support regime.
Prior to the Geneva Accord, the United States was adamantly
opposed to  the adoption of PSEs as an instrument of agricultural trade
reform, except possibly as a policy monitoring instrument.  The U.S.
17seems  to have given considerable weight to  the argument  that the use of
the PSE to bind levels of protection affords too much scope for
cheating.  Recent U.S. emphasis on the merits of converting all
measures of agricultural trade  protection to the form of tariffs  (so-
called "tariffication")  suggests that, despite abandoning the "zero-
option,"  the attitude  to PSEs has not changed.  Thus a major battle
seems  likely between the EC and the  US on the role of PSEs in any final
agreement.
Extending and tightening GATT rules and disciplines
The main areas of contention on this issue are:
1)  Non-tariff barriers  (NTBs),  including VILs and VERs, as well as
import quotas,  and
2)  Export subsidies.
NTBs
On this issue, the principle objective for  the EC  is  to retain the
continued use of the VIL providing absolute protection from imports.
In the writer's view the EC is very unlikely to relax agricultural
import restrictions significantly in the foreseeable future.  The
reason for this judgement is  the paramountcy of Community preference.
It  is pertinent here to recall Josling's observation that "without
Community preference we don't have a common market"  (Josling, 1984).
Proposals for capping VILs,  or converting them to tariffs, are likely
to be strongly resisted by the EC due to  the  relative weakness of these
as alternative protective instruments.  Surrendering the VIL, and the
variable export levy  (VEL)  would expose  the internal Community market
to  the vagaries of the world market, the very danger which the CAP is
18explicitly designed to prevent.
A simple  diagrammatic presentation of the mechanics of CAP price
support serves to show:
1)  How the VIL provides absolute protection, as well as
2)  Why VIL > VES
3)  Why VES - PSEu  (or SMUu)
4)  Why PSEu  (or SMUu)  fails  to  reflect  the nominal rate of protection
(NPR) afforded by VIL.
The analysis which follows is based on the  CAP cereals  support regime.
In Figure 2, Pth,  Pi,  Pp,  Pw respectively signify the threshold price,
the intervention price, the producer price and the world price of
cereals.  The following definitions  then apply:  VIL - Pth - Pw,  and
VES - Pp  - Pw.  The reason why VIL > VES  is that, due  to Community
preference, Pth > Pp.  Officially, the discrepancy between Pth and Pi
(denoted by TC in Figure 2) is  accounted for by the cost of unloading
imported grain at Rotterdam and transporting it to the point within the
EC domestic market with the largest local grain surplus  (Duisburg, in
Germany).  In practice, however, the gap between Pth and Pi is  fixed
generously so as  also to provide a "safe" margin of Community
preference.
In principle, and occasionally in practice, Pp>Pi.  However, Pp<Pi
is  increasingly the norm due  to deliberate CAP price policy
adjustments to weaken the downside link between Pp and Pi.  For
cereals,  the minimum producer price has officially been reduced to only
about 90 percent of Pi.  In addition, the conditions surrounding
intervention purchases of most commodities,  including minimum quality
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Mechanics of CAP price supportstandards,  the duration of intervention periods and other market
conditions, have been progressively tightened.  Thus, while relative  to
a given Pw, VIL remains unchanged, VES and PSEu become progressively
smaller.
Since the definitions of VES and PSEU are identical,  it is  clear
why VES-PSEu (or SMUu).  More importantly, because VIL>VES and
VES-PSEu, VIL>PSEU and PSEu (or SMUu) must inevitably fail to reflect
the full nominal rate of protection  (NPR)  afforded by VIL.
It  is difficult  to  see how, short of banning  its use,  the GATT
could be extended to  deal with the VIL.  But the  EC is very unlikely to
agree  to  such a ban.  It might therefore be more fruitful  to negotiate
reductions in  threshold prices  to reduce the VIL's margin of protection
(or Community preference).  A willingness on the part of the U.S. and
other GATT negotiators to show flexibility on the issue of re-balancing
might further enhance prospects of success in this direction.1
lIn its latest GATT paper tabled in Geneva  (September,  1989),  the EC apparently offers to negotiate on the method used to determine the VIL.  A  "transparent method of calculation" is  offered "to ensure that the amount of the variable levy is strictly  limited to  the difference between the external  [world]  price and the entry  [threshold]  price as defined in advance."  The main conditions governing the EC's willingness to reduce  the  entry price appears to be  (a) reciprocal reductions  of domestic prices by other contracting parties,  and (b) flexibility on re-balancing.  The main condition concerning the EC's willingness to move on the  definition of the external  price used to determine the VIL appears  to be that other negotiating parties agree  to accept some concept resembling the  EC's proposed fixed reference price (see page 10 above).  For further details of the latest EC paper,  see Inside U.S. Trade:  Special ReDort,  Sept. 29,  1989.
20Export subsidies
It would appear that the main objective of the  EC on this  issue
is  to retain the use  of the VES  as  an export marketing "weapon,"
subject only to budgetary constraints.  The Community is  therefore
unlikely to yield easily to  international pressure on this issue  as,
for example, by consenting to  re-negotiate Article XVI:3 of the
General Agreement either to  "cap" the subsidy per unit of exports, or
to  limit the quantity subsidized.  However, due to  budget constraints,
the  EC might yield more easily upon this  issue  than upon NTBs.
In a paper tabled in Geneva in July 1989 entitled "The EC
Approach on Aggregate Measurement of Support"  (MTN.GNG/NGS/W/96), the
Community offered to bind and freeze the SMU for an agreed period
provided, of course,  that other parties  to the negotiations agree to
adopting the SMU as the common AMS.  This offer appears  to go some way
towards agreeing to bind unit export subsidies.
In its most recent September 1989 paper entitled "Improving the
GATT Rules and Disciplines,"  as reported in Inside U.S. Trade:
Special Report, September 29,  1989,  the Community appears  to accept the
proposal  that in Article XVI:3 the reference period used to determine
"equitable"  market shares should be defined quite explicitly as  "the
average of three to  five most recent calendar years."  This appears to
signify that the EC may also be prepared to accept the quantitative
limitation of subsidized exports.
It may be surmised that the  EC's preferred solution to  the
problem of export competition is  still a market sharing agreement
amongst the major agricultural exporting countries,  including an
21agreement to fix export prices.  Failing this,  the Community might
agree to  further policy adjustments effectively transferring a growing
proportion of the costs  of surplus disposal from the budget to
producers themselves.  Two-tier pricing is  a policy instrument which
could be more widely adopted and applied to  this end.  Two-tier pricing
already exists  in the  EC for sugar and could be extended to other
commodities, either by the EC acting unilaterally, or  through
international negotiations.
The scheme  of Production Entitlement Guarantees  (PEGs) as
recently advocated by members of the International Agricultural Trade
Research Consortium  (IATRC)  is an example of the application of the
concept of two-tier pricing.
PEGs
A PEG program would "limit the quantity of production of
individua  farmers eligible to receive support payments and therefore
on the total quantity that receive payments"  (Blandford, et al.,  1989).
A PEG is not a quota, but a two-tier pricing instrument with the lower-
tier price at the  free market level and involving the use of deficiency
payments.
Figure 3 shows  the difference between a conventional deficiency
payment scheme without supply control, and a PEG  scheme of two-tier
pricing.  The unit deficiency payment is  Ps-Pw and, without a PEG
scheme, aggregate production equilibrium is  at Q and the aggregate PSE
(or budget cost of support) is  Q(Ps-Pw).  To avoid distorting trade,
the PEG quantity Q*,  is  set to the  left of the level of output









PEG system of farm income supportwith world supply, Pw.  That is  the PEG which attracts  the higher tier
price, Ps,  does not distort  trade.  Producers  are free  to expand
output beyond Q*, but only at the  lower-tier, world price.  Thus the
adoption of PEG-type  two-tier pricing obviates  trade distortion and
implies  the complete abandonment of subsidized exports.  A further
advantage is  that the  support budget  (and PSE)  is  reduced from Q(Ps-Pw)
to Q*(Ps-Pw).
Existing U.S. cereal and cotton support programs bear some
resemblance to  the PEG scheme, but ARP restrictions would have to be
removed to permit producers  to  expand production without limit at  the
world price.  But if U.S. export supplies of grains and other
commodities are  as elastic as some analysts have suggested, the  rapid
removal of supply control could have serious international
repercussions and even provoke retaliation by competing exporters.
Some U.S. policy analysts  take the view that the current  grain
support program already exposes participating producers to two-tier
pricing at the margin of production because the program payment yield
is  frozen at a historic  (pre-1985) level  (e.g.,  Thompson, 1988).  But
other analysts taking a different view of whether or not farmers  equate
marginal costs and revenues, disagree.
More importantly, a recently announced change in the  1990 wheat
program permits producers to  expand their wheat acreage beyond the  95
percent of wheat base, up to a maximum of 105 percent, provided they
give up their entitlement to  deficiency payment support below the 95
percent level, on an acre for acre basis, appears  to be a further move
in  the direction of two-tier pricing  (USDA, 1989).
23Until now, the  EC has adopted the deficiency payment system of
support only for oil  seeds and some minor crops like durum wheat:  so
the community would have further to  go than the U.S.  in changing over
to a PEG system of farm income support.  However, production levies --
a form of "stabilizer"  -- are already collected from individual EC
producer through grain merchants.  Thus, even in the EC,  a system of
deficiency payments linked to a limited output quantity may not be
beyond the bounds of administrative or budget feasibility.  However,
the budgetary implications of changing from the existing system of farm
income support in the EC, which imposes most of the costs of support on
consumers, to a system which transfers the whole cost to  taxpayers,
remains as a serious obstacle to  the adoption of PEGs  in the current
fiscal climate.
If PEGs were ever considered seriously as a policy reform option
in international negotiations, certain technical problems would have to
be resolved such as each country's aggregate PEG quantity entitlement.
Although current domestic consumption might be acceptable as a proxy
measure, this and related issues could be contentious and difficult to
resolve.
The PEG proposal  is similar  in conception to some recently
canvassed schemes of de-coupled pavments to replace farm commodity
price support.  So,  for example, it has been proposed that for an
indefinite period existing farmers should be entitled to receive annual
payments of constant nominal value based on historic levels of direct
income payments.  Apart from such payments,  they would have to rely
solely on open market prices for their  income (Agricultural Policy
24Working Group, 1989).  However, de-coupling is  likely to be resisted by
producers, and may encounter taxpayer opposition too,  if it is  felt
that  farmers should not be entitled to payments  for "doing nothing."
The  advocates of PEGs  argue that if de-coupling failed to gain
political acceptance for  this or other reasons,  "the value of the PEG
is  that it provides a minimally distorting alternative when the
complete elimination of support  is not politically possible"  (Blanford,
et al.,  1989).
Domestic production subsidies
It has been suggested that Art. XVI:3 might be extended to
include domestic  as well as  export subsidies.  It seems unlikely that
the EC would agree to rules  limiting the amounts of per unit production
subsidies.  But since  it does favor giving PSE credits for domestic
supply control measures, the Community might agree to quantitative
limits on aggregate domestic production subsidy payments.  Some recent
CAP reforms already point in this  direction.  For example, the beef
support regime has recently been modified to limit "headage payments"
to a maximum of 90 steers.  The sheep regime has similarly been
modified to limit the full headage payment to either 500 or 1,000 ewes,
depending upon the breed and/or region.  Above these  limits, "surplus"
ewes attract only a half headage payment.  The primary objective of
these and similar schemes  is  to  target income  support where it is most
needed, as well as making a budget saving.  Such schemes are clearly
open to abuse and manipulation, like "large"  producers subdividing
their herds/flocks into smaller units through collusion with "smaller"
relatives or neighbors.
255.  Summary and conclusions
This paper points  to four major conclusions on the stance taken
by the European Community in the Uruguay Round agricultural
negotiations.
First, because the Community is  interested in CAP reform
primarily for internal, mainly budgetary reasons,  it would be unwise to
expect major concessions to be made to  trade competitors.  External
pressures for reform have been relatively unimportant  in the past and
appear likely to remain so in the future.
Second, the EC seems  to be quite well disposed to PSEs  and has
offered to bind and lower support measured in this way.  Progress seems
more  likely via this route than by the alternative route of trying to
make the CAP conform to tighter GATT rules and disciplines.
Third, despite  some recent signs of greater flexibility on the
issue, the Community is likely to be especially resistant to attempt to
whittle away its margin of Community preference, or seriously interfere
with the absolute protection afforded by the VIL.
Finally, due to the primacy of budget control and the heavy
burden of export subsidies,  the EC may be responsive to proposals for
reducing or  limiting export subsidies by multilateral agreement,
provided the incomes of the most vulnerable producers can be protected.
It may also be willing to consider limiting domestic production
subsidies  along the same lines.
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